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Lincoln and his Politically Appointed Generals
The jury is still very much out on the long-standing historical indictment of
Abraham Lincoln over his eager, naïve, and allegedly haphazard recruitment of
hapless, if popularly appealing, political and ethnic generals to fight for the
Union. David Work, in his first major book, has gone a long way toward
exoneration.
This is a subject that has engaged historians for quite some time. By
tradition, the story holds that Lincoln, the green, untested, and uncertain
commander in chief, put far too much reliance on Democrats and Germans in
order to both raise needed troops and hold the pro-Union but anti-slavery
political center in the effort to preserve the Union. The military result, this
traditional version of the story maintains, was unmitigated disaster—at horribly
high cost in human life. Recent scholarship has added much nuance to this old,
simplistic point of view, but done little to relieve Lincoln of responsibility for, at
best, a high degree of feckless cynicism.
In an essay for the Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association back in
2000, for example, Brooks D. Simpson re-examined the long-held belief that
so-called political generals like John McClernand, John C. Frémont, and Franz
Sigel were more than “unmitigated disaster[s]" on the battlefield, whatever their
value to Lincoln’s campaign for re-election." Ultimately, Simpson came down
on the side of tradition, arguing that the most famous “political generals" did so
poorly in that critical year of 1864 that, whatever good political reasons for
appointing them three years earlier at the outbreak of the rebellion, “their
retention proved costly." In Simpson’s words: “The costly military mistakes
these men made outweighed whatever political benefit their retention may have
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realized. Retaining incompetent generals in order to appease political
constituencies thwarted the chance for a victory in 1864 and increased the human
toll on the battlefield… Victory may have come in spite of the decision to retain
these men in command, not because of it." These were harsh words indeed.
In his recent book on the American Civil War, the pre-eminent military
historian John Keegan did not dissent. When war broke out in 1861, he asserts,
the Union turned to lawyers, teachers, and businessmen, often “those with
political experience," as substitutes “in the absence of an officer class." But as
Keegan sees it: “Standing in the community did not, however, necessarily
translate into ability as a military leader, particularly of military innocents." But
James M. McPherson offered a convincing dissent in his Lincoln Prize-winning,
Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief (2008). Critics of
Lincoln’s political generals may be right, McPherson suggests, but only in the
narrowest sense. Professionally trained generals were often disastrous, too, he
notes. And more importantly, “consideration of national strategy trumped
military strategy. The mass mobilization that brought 637,000 men into the
Union army in less than a year could not have taken place without an enormous
effort by local and state politicians as well as by prominent ethnic leaders."
Now it is time for all historians—and all students of the Civil War—to read
David Work’s well-researched and persuasively argued version of this story.
Work does not dispute Simpson’s contention that Lincoln’s insistence on
keeping Sigel in high command through the 1864 election campaign in order to
cement his German support resulted in such disasters as New Market. But the
author advances a convincing theory to re-consider and re-interpret the overall
record of Lincoln’s political and ethnic generals.
Work does not shy away from piling on examples of these commanders’
gross incompetence: Nathaniel Banks’ “idiotic" work at Port Hudson, Sigel’s
incompetence at Sulfur Springs, McClernand’s horrific decisions at Fort
Donelson, Thomas Meagher’s failures at Fredericksburg. Work piles on the
woeful stories: failure to enforce discipline, inability to process intelligence,
outrages against the civilian population, and absurd braggadocio.
Yet the author also reminds us of Benjamin Butler’s brave and visionary
identification of fleeing slaves, or “contrabands of war," as he called them, as a
potentially revolutionary element in prosecuting the war. Both Butler and Banks
experimented with “contract labor" systems meant to introduce ex-slaves into the
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world of paid work, and however flawed their efforts, however ultimately unfair
to blacks, it was an earnest effort that went well beyond the Lincoln
Administration’s reluctance to deal with the issue of contrabands and, ultimately,
freedmen. Butler was among the first, moreover, to enlist blacks to fight in the
military, despite widespread opposition (and lack of initial support from Lincoln
himself). Work’s complex overall portrait of Butler as a field commander and
occupier are particularly fascinating and rewarding—especially his account of
the general’s work in New Orleans, where he famously made war not only
against Southern women who insulted federal soldiers, but also against foreign
consuls who stubbornly sided with the Confederacy even after the Crescent City
fell to the Union. Another political general, John A. Dix, is given some of the
credit he deserves for helping to quell the New York draft riots of July 1863.
In sum, the author defends Lincoln’s decision to seek Democrats and
foreign-born leaders to raise troops as a legitimate weapon of war, pointing out
that unifying the North and its disparate political and ethnic elements was no
small task for a new president who had received only 55% of the northern vote.
True, men like Dan Sickles carried notoriety with them to high command, but
Work reminds us that the idea of political generals was a time-tested tradition in
American military affairs; President Polk, he notes, was far more reckless and
brazen by excluding Whig generals, whenever he could, from opportunity for
glory during the Mexican War (Taylor and Scott were simply too good to hold
down). Besides, Work adds, Democratic generals like John A. Logan did well
enough to earn major reputations during Lincoln’s war. As for ethnic choices
like Franz Sigel (“the strongest German in the Union," in Thurlow Weed’s
words), “the loyalty of both the Germans and Irish was impossible to predict" in
early 1861. Lincoln was no fool politically; his Republican party was a
brand-new coalition, and he did what he needed to do to satisfy his far-flung
tapestry of support in time of emergency.
Work reaches another compelling conclusion. He argues that the so-called
political generals who served “under professional officers" who were trained at
West Point tended to “function creditably." Only when these political generals
“received independent commands invariably failed." In sum, the contributions of
political generals to the Union war effort was, the author insists, at worst “a
mixed blessing."
As Work believes, Lincoln’s reliance on political generals looks far worse in
hindsight than it did during the crisis of the Union. When the war broke out, he
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points out, there were simply not enough professional generals to go around. Nor
was there any real reason to believe “that politicians or any civilians would not
make good generals." Besides, civilian commanders had performed well during
many of the nation’s previous military crises. True, as Work concedes, political
generals exhibited many liabilities: “they hesitated, did not act decisively,
allowed their forces to become strung out, failed to reconnoiter, and struggled to
understand the complex situations that developed on the battlefield." But in all
these shortcomings, they were often no more incompetent than the most
elaborately trained professionals. (How effective, after all, was the experienced
and well-trained McClellan—who was allegedly non-political but turned out to
be the Democratic candidate opposing Lincoln’s bid for a second term?)
Work believes that most political generals “fell somewhere between
mediocre and competent, depending on how much responsibility they held… .
How successful a political general was on the battlefield was often determined
buy the size of his first unit." More importantly, and not to be underestimated,
they certainly did expand political support for the war—for which success they
too often lack the credit they deserve. They were often good administrators,
excelling as commanders of military departments and districts, and they
represented a positive force against slavery (think of Frémont’s precipitant
emancipation orders) in behalf of black freedom and enlistment.
Considering their frequent battlefield failures, were their appointments
worth it? Work insists they were, and it will be hard for future generations of
scholars to make a different, better, or more convincing argument. This is a very
fine study. Still missing is a good analysis of how Jefferson Davis fared with his
own political generals on the other side of the conflict—think John C.
Breckinridge. Maybe Work had better get back to work.
Harold Holzer, co-chairman of the U. S. Lincoln Bicentennial Commission,
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